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Abstract  
Conflict resolution, public goods and patent thickets+ 
Author(s):* Dietmar Harhoff, University of Munich 
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Stefan Wagner, ESMT 
Post-grant validity challenges at patent offices rely on the private initiative of third 
parties to correct mistakes made by patent offices. We hypothesize that incentives 
to bring post-grant validity challenges are reduced when many firms benefit from 
revocation of a patent and when firms are caught up in patent thickets. Using data 
on opposition against patents at the European Patent Office we show that 
opposition decreases in fields in which many others profit from patent revocations. 
Moreover, in fields with a large number of mutually blocking patents the incidence 
of opposition is sharply reduced, particularly among large firms and firms that are 
caught up directly in patent thickets. These findings indicate that post-grant 
patent review may not constitute an effective correction device for erroneous 
patent grants in technologies affected by either patent thickets or highly dispersed 
patent ownership. 
Keywords: intellectual property, opposition, patent litigation, patent thickets, 
patents, post-grant review 




Over the last three decades the demand for patents has been steadily growing at patent offices around 
the world. A number of researchers have argued that a large proportion of these new patents may be 
“weak” or marginal in terms of their contribution to the state of the art (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004; Bessen 
and Meurer, 2008; Lei and Wright, 2009). Mechanisms, such as opposition and litigation, that 
complement the efforts of patent offices in examining and stripping out weak patent applications 
should be welfare-enhancing in such a context (Graham et al., 2003; Hall et al., 2004; Hall and 
Harhoff, 2004; Choi, 2005; Graham and Harhoff, 2009). 
While these mechanisms are often cost effective (Lemley, 2001), several authors have argued that they 
will be undermined by a public goods problem (Levin and Levin, 2003; Farrell and Merges, 2004; 
Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004). When many parties profit from the revocation or annulment of a patent, 
private incentives of any single party may no longer be sufficiently strong to initiate such a challenge. 
We confirm this prediction using data on post-grant review at the European Patent Office. 
Additionally, we demonstrate that the presence of patent thickets in complex technologies further 
weakens incentives for filing post-grant reviews and that this effect is strongest for patent applications 
made by firms at the center of patent thickets as well as for larger firms. 
Examination and granting processes are the central quality assurance mechanism at patent offices, but 
they are frequently impaired by errors. While patent applicants have various ways of eliminating errors 
not favorable to them during the examination of their application, errors in their favor are less likely to 
be corrected by the patent office. Errors made in the granting process are therefore likely to be 
asymmetric: on average, examination will result in granting exclusion rights that are too strong or 
broad given the standards that should prevail in the patent system and therefore interests of the public 
and of rival firms are compromised and social welfare is reduced. 
Litigation and post-grant validity challenges at patent offices and courts should provide effective 
mechanisms to correct the erroneous issue of patents (Levin and Levin, 2003; Farrell and Merges, 
2004; Hall and Harhoff, 2004). Both mechanisms allow third parties to bring forward additional 
evidence on the validity and scope of patent applications. Usually these parties have an interest in 
reducing the scope of a rival’s patent application or having the patent annulled completely, providing a 
natural counterbalance to the interests of the applicant (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004). The United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is currently introducing a process of post-grant validity review 
in order to enhance its ability to weed out weak patents within the America Invents Act (AIA) of 
2011.1  
                                                 
1  For more information on the America Invents Act of 2011 see 
http://judiciary.house.gov/issues/issues_patentreformact2011.html, latest visit on 16th of October 2012. 
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The effectiveness of validity challenges depends on the strength of third-party incentives to challenge 
a patent. Previous research shows that the likelihood of litigating patents is positively related to patent 
and firm level characteristics such as the value of patent applications and the opponent’s expectation 
of winning the case (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004). We extend this 
line of research by introducing characteristics of the technology space in which patenting takes place. 
First, we test the strength of the public goods effect in post-grant review. Second, we investigate how 
the presence of and entanglement in patent thickets affects incentives to mount validity challenges. 
The public goods problem arises whenever several firms benefit from the revocation or narrowing of a 
patent application. The party investing in the invalidation of a granted patent provides a public good to 
all firms who would see their profits reduced, if the patent were to stand. In a technology area with 
fragmented ownership, an opponent who successfully challenges a patent will profit less on average 
than in a field with highly concentrated ownership. This reduces incentives to engage in post-grant 
challenges (Farrell and Merges, 2004). Therefore, we expect the incidence of post-grant validity 
challenges to be positively related to the concentration of patent holdings.  
Moreover, in the presence of patent thickets, in which large numbers of patents with overlapping 
claims (Shapiro, 2000) are owned by multiple parties, firms’ incentives to file costly post-grant 
validity challenges may be reduced further. Patent thickets arise when many patents are filed 
concurrently and patent claims are not clearly delineated, resulting in multiple overlapping claims. In 
such an environment, firms are exposed to the threat of litigation and of subsequent injunctions, which 
would hold up production. By threatening countersuits patent applicants can prevent other producing 
firms from challenging their patents and from engaging in patent enforcement (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2003)2. Consequently firms engulfed in patent thickets have incentives to create large 
patent portfolios to protect themselves against litigation and injunctions (Ziedonis, 2004). To avoid an 
escalation of litigation, firms in patent thickets frequently resolve overlapping claims through non-
adversarial means, such as cross-licensing, broad settlement agreements and other out-of-court 
agreements (Shapiro, 2000).  
This suggests that patent thickets will reduce the incidence of post-grant validity challenges, even if 
the cost of such challenges is low. In particular, the reduction in post-grant validity challenges is likely 
to be stronger for those firms deeply enmeshed in patent thickets – we refer to these firms as patent 
thicket insiders. Studies of these phenomena have been made difficult by a lack of suitable measures 
regarding the extent and strength of blocking relationships. Drawing on previous research (Graevenitz 
                                                 
2  These two forms of litigation may constitute separate or related institutions. Post-grant reviews (called 
opposition in Europe) only address issues of validity. In some jurisdictions (e.g. in Germany), questions of 
validity may also be treated by dedicated courts while infringement issues are addressed separately. In the 
USA, an infringement suit may be answered by an invalidity attack on the plaintiff’s patent(s), or by a 
countersuit alleging infringement by the plaintiff himself, as in the case of Yahoo vs. Facebook. 
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et al., 2011), we use citation data to identify and to measure the intensity of such blocking 
relationships. 
To the best of our knowledge, the main hypotheses of this paper have not been tested empirically 
before. This study uses data on opposition proceedings against patents granted at the European Patent 
Office (EPO). Opposition is relatively frequent – historically, 6.2% of all EPO-granted patents have 
been opposed. Moreover, the time window for oppositions is narrow so that we can apply precisely 
timed covariates to capture other potential determinants of opposition. Measures of patent ownership 
concentration and of mutual blocking relationships between patent holders are used to identify the 
public goods and patent thicket effects on the incidence of post-grant validity challenges. Our 
empirical results show that incentives to file an opposition against a patent grant are significantly 
reduced by these two effects: a one standard deviation increase in the concentration of patent holdings 
reduces the incidence of patent opposition by roughly 12.5% relative to the average unconditional 
probability. A one standard deviation increase in our measure of thickets reduces the incidence of 
post-grant validity challenges by 22.2% relative to the average unconditional probability. These 
findings show that technology areas in which the social value of post-grant validity challenges can be 
assumed to be particularly high (i.e., where dense patent thickets and/or high fragmentation of patent 
ownership exist), private incentives to invest in post-grant validity challenges are lower than in other 
technology areas.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds in five sections. In section 2, we describe the institutional 
background of oppositions at the EPO. Section 3 summarizes the theoretical arguments regarding 
drivers of post-grant validity challenges which we use to derive our hypotheses. Data and descriptive 
statistics are presented in section 4, while section 5 presents the results of our multivariate analyses. 
We discuss implications for the management of intellectual property and for public policy in the 
concluding section. 
2 Institutional Background and Effects of Opposition against Granted Patents at the EPO 
Since it commenced operating in 1978, the EPO has offered a harmonized application path for patent 
applicants that seek patent protection in one or more signatory states of the European patent 
convention. The EPO’s activities are based on the European Patent Convention (EPC) signed in 1973. 
A patent application granted by the EPO does not lead to a single “European patent” that grants 
protection in the designated states chosen by the applicant, but to a bundle of independently 
enforceable and revocable national patent rights. However, the grant decision of the EPO is subject to 
a central post-grant review mechanism which can be initiated by any third party within nine months of 
the grant date. If no opposition is filed within this time period, the patent’s validity can only be 
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challenged under the legal rules of the respective countries where it takes effect.3 Third parties will 
have to challenge the national patent rights in the responsible national courts for each state separately 
which will be extremely costly as compared to the centralized opposition proceeding. 
The opposition procedure at the EPO is a quasi-judicial process taking place in front of an Opposition 
Division consisting of “three technically qualified examiners, at least two of whom shall not have 
taken part in the proceedings for grant of the patent to which the opposition relates” (Art. 19 (2) EPC). 
Opposition may be filed on grounds listed in Art. 100 EPC. These are (i) the subject matter is not 
patentable under the terms of the EPC Art. 52 to 574, (ii) the patent does not disclose the invention 
clearly enough or in its entirety so that it could be carried out by a person skilled in the art, or (iii) the 
subject matter of the European patent extends beyond the content of the original application. If not 
rejected according to Art. 102(1) EPC, an opposition can lead to either the maintenance of the patent 
as it was granted, the maintenance in amended form or the revocation of the opposed European patent 
(and therefore all resulting national patent rights) as specified in Art 102 (3) EPC. The outcome of the 
opposition procedure is subject to appeal of the patent holder and the opponent to the Technical 
Boards of Appeal at the EPO. 
Most of the literature analyzing post-grant validity challenges has focused on U.S. patent litigation 
where the vast majority of cases are settled out of court (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004a)5. For that 
context, it is quite appropriate to assume that the parties involved will resolve all those cases out of 
court in which the legal issues are transparent. In the opposition context, this consideration is less 
likely to hold. While there is some settlement activity, most cases actually go to “trial” and are 
resolved in either opposition or appeal proceedings. This is due both to institutional and financial 
considerations: settlements during the opposition proceedings are risky as the EPO may pursue the 
case of its own motion according to Rule 84(2) EPC. That restricts settlements to the pre-filing period, 
which is exogenously set to nine months following the grant. On the financial side, it is unlikely that 
settlement is much less expensive than attacking or defending the patent in opposition. Moreover, an 
opposition proceeding is the only centralized way to challenge European patents and its cost is 
comparably low. The average cost of opposing a patent at the EPO has been estimated to range from 
€6,000 to €50,000 (including patent lawyers’ fees) and is therefore considerably lower than the cost of 
                                                 
3  Note that the procedural design proposed by the America Invents Act of 2011 is almost identical, see 
http://judiciary.house.gov/issues/issues_patentreformact2011.html, last accessed on 16th of October 2012. 
4  See EPC Art. 52-57. The subject matter may not be novel (Art. 52(1), 54 and 55 EPC), does not involve an 
inventive step (Art. 52(1), 56 EPC), cannot be used in an industrial application (Art. 52(1) and 57 EPC), is 
not regarded an invention (Art. 57 EPC) or is not patentable according to Art. 53 EPC. 
5  The ongoing reform of the US patent system will implement a post-grant review institution which is 
somewhat comparable to the opposition system at the EPO as described here, See Section 6) of H.R. 1249: 
America Invents Act, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr1249enr/pdf/BILLS-
112hr1249enr.pdf?__utma=37760702.727769229.1315824201.1315824201.1315824201.1&__utmb=377607
02.4.9.1315824230757&__utmc=37760702&__utmx=-& __utmz= 37760702.1315824201.1.1. utmcsr= 
google|utmccn=(, last accessed on September, 12th, 2011). However, it is unclear how costly post-grant 
review at the USPTO will be, since it may involve discovery. 
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litigating a patent in multiple national courts.6 Finally, strategic opportunities to drive up the other 
party’s costs are virtually nonexistent in the European setting. 
Revoking erroneously granted or narrowing patents during opposition proceedings after they have 
been specified too broadly can prevent welfare losses. These would emerge due to the market power 
given to a holder of an erroneously granted patent (Graham and Harhoff, 2009). If the patent is 
revoked in opposition, the gain in welfare equals the welfare loss that society would have incurred in 
the case of the patent being upheld and enforced. The revocation of these patents can have two effects 
– it effectively eliminates the need for subsequent litigation - or it reduces the room for extracting 
licensing fees from competitors. It is more difficult to assess the welfare effects of a rejection of an 
opposition. If the opposition is rejected, then the patent was presumably correctly specified and there 
is no benefit from the opposition. Conceivably, there could still be a litigation-reducing effect if 
opposition has demonstrated the legal robustness of the patent. The intermediate outcome of 
opposition –– an amendment of the patent by which the original patent is modified and restricted in 
scope or breadth – can be seen as a convex combination of the two polar cases. In both cases, the 
benefits from opposition have to be compared to the resource costs of the opposition and appeals 
process. 
Leaving aside the resource costs of the trial, there are potential social costs of opposition. Judicial 
processes take time to resolve and during that period uncertainty is not resolved. If the parties to a trial 
do not anticipate the outcomes perfectly, their incentives to invest in innovation or the production of a 
product based on a patent will suffer and welfare gains from the introduction of technology are 
postponed. Without observing actual investment and R&D decisions, it is difficult to assess the 
likelihood of the FUD (fear, uncertainty and doubt) scenario. One indication might be the likelihood of 
opposition against small patent applicants such as start-ups, SMEs or independent inventors. 
Assuming that these agents do not have a “deep purse”, they would be likely to become particularly 
attractive targets of opposition procedures (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004b). This effect is likely to 
be pronounced, if the private costs of opposition are high. 
Assuming that the patent is correctly delineated from the prior art after opposition, the opposition 
mechanism should be welfare increasing as long as the expected reductions in welfare losses from 
errors in the granting process are larger than the total social cost of opposition.  Particularly valuable 
patents have been shown to be more likely attacked under opposition than less valuable ones (Harhoff 
and Reitzig, 2004). This indicates that the opposition procedure also serves as an information 
revelation mechanism as valuable patents (those causing potentially high welfare losses) are selected 
based on the information third parties bring to the table. This selection of high-value patents into 
                                                 
6  An average litigation case will cost around 160.000 EUR in Germany. Mejer and van Pottelsberghe (2009) 
also provide examples with costs as high as €2 to €10 Mio EUR, but these are exceptional and not 
representative. See Harhoff (2009) for estimates of litigation costs in other European countries. 
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opposition makes it likely that the overall effect of opposition is welfare-increasing. Detailed analyses 
of the welfare effects of opposition can be found in the analysis of the introduction of a post-grant 
opposition system in the U.S. undertaken by Levin and Levin (2003) as well as Graham and Harhoff 
(2009). Both papers suggest that there is significant potential for positive welfare gains from the 
introduction of a patent opposition process.7  
 
3 Incentives to Engage in Post-grant Validity Challenges 
In this paper we analyse whether individual patents are opposed post-grant. In doing so we focus on 
characteristics of the patent, the applicant and the technology area. Our aim is to identify which factors 
increase or decrease the incidence of opposition, so as to establish whether post-grant opposition 
serves applicants patenting different kinds of technology equally well. In this section we review 
related literature and develop a number of hypotheses that guide our empirical analysis below. 
Much theoretical analysis of litigation, and by extension of patent litigation and post-grant opposition, 
is concerned with the fundamental question why a dispute should arise at all (Lanjouw and Lerner, 
1998; Waldfogel, 1998). The challenge in this literature is to explain why two parties cannot resolve 
their dispute privately and must resort to a court. As our own work does not focus on the 
characteristics of the opponent, nor on the outcomes of the opposition case we draw on this literature 
only in so far as it identifies variables that help us to capture patent value or litigation behaviour of 
specific applicants. 
In this vein Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) provide an important analysis of the general features of 
patent litigation in the USA. They compare the characteristics of litigated patents and their owners to 
those of a control group of patents. Litigation risk is distributed in a heterogeneous manner across firm 
types and technologies. They establish the following empirical results: i) more valuable patents are 
more likely to become involved in litigation; ii) parties with large portfolios are attacked less often, 
i.e., are presumably able to use settlements instead of litigation; iii) foreign (non-US patent holders) 
are less likely to be involved in US litigation; iv) litigation risk is much higher in pharmaceuticals than 
in other technologies.8 Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004a) also show that the risk of litigation for 
patents owned by individuals or firms with small patent portfolios is much higher. They argue that 
holders of relatively large portfolios of patents are more likely to trade licenses and may engage in 
other forms of “cooperative” dispute resolution. Hence, these types of patent owners are less likely to 
                                                 
7  Graham and Harhoff (2009) point out that this result depends crucially on the assumption that opposition is 
not too costly. 
8  The average incidence of infringement litigation is about one case per 100 patents. But the rate varies 
between 0.5 cases in chemicals to 2 cases per hundred patents for pharmaceuticals. Lerner (1995) estimates a 
likelihood of six cases per hundred patents in biotechnology in the time period 1990-1994. Generally, these 
authors point out that the frequency of litigation decreases as a technical sector matures.  
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pursue infringement suits in court. A significant disadvantage for smaller firms results from this – they 
face a high risk of litigation, and are less well positioned to resolve cases amicably. Their work is 
based on the assumption that only highly controversial cases or cases with high settlement costs will 
be filed or even adjudicated at court. Given the institutional setup of opposition and its relatively low 
costs, our own work below takes as given the incidence of disputes and the inability of some parties to 
settle their disputes outside of court. The very advantage of opposition data lies in the fact that the 
selection effects are less pronounced than in the case of US litigation.9 
The first main hypothesis we test is based on Farrell and Merges (2004). They consider the 
effectiveness of litigation as a mechanism to weed out granted patents that are either weak or 
excessively broad. They develop a theoretical model and show that when a weak patent affects the 
prospective payoffs of more than one potential infringer, litigation activity by any one of the infringers 
becomes a (partial) public good. Harhoff and Reitzig (2004, fn. 25) also point out that the incentives to 
invest in opposition will be strong when only a small number of firms benefits from the public good, 
e.g., in tight oligopoly structures, and relatively weak when a large number of firms would benefit 
from the public good, e.g., in competitive markets. We assume here that the concentration of patent 
ownership (among potential opponents) is positively related to concentration in product markets so 
that we can derive the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Patents granted to firms whose rivals’ patent portfolios are more concentrated are more 
likely to be opposed. 
Bessen and Meurer (2006) argue that innocent infringement may be an important source of disputes 
between patent owners. In this setting a firm may include a technology already patented by a rival in 
their own application because they are not aware of the earlier patent. If the patent examiner also 
misses the earlier patent, then the owner of that patent can challenge the later patent through post-grant 
review. Innocent infringement is more likely to arise where patents are poorly delineated and where 
overlap of patent rights is highly likely. Consequently, we might expect more opposition cases to arise 
in technology areas affected by patent thickets or between firms caught up in these thickets. 
There is an important countervailing effect. In the 1980s dense patent thickets emerged in the 
semiconductor industry after a number of firms successfully obtained injunctions against their rivals 
(Grindley and Teece, 1997; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Hall, 2005). In order to avoid costly settlements 
or shut down of business activity, firms in the industry sought to extend their own patent portfolios 
such as to be able to file a countersuit against potential attackers. This logic led to races between firms 
in the course of which large patent portfolios were built (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Federal Trade 
                                                 
9  We note here that this result cannot be confirmed in our analysis of opposition data. Individuals are less 
likely to be attacked under opposition even once the value of the patent has been taken into account.  
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Commission, 2003). This process has been compared to the cold-war arms race between the USA and 
the USSR. 
In such an environment, unilateral hostile actions can trigger counter-attacks. Within a patent thicket 
we expect a firm to be very careful when using patent opposition against applicants that are in a strong 
position to oppose one or more of the firm’s own patent applications, which reduces the incidence of 
patent opposition between firms caught in the same thicket. This effect will become particularly 
pronounced as the number of potential actions increases in very dense patent thickets. Based on this 
discussion we hypothesize that the effect of avoiding a scenario of mutually assured destruction 
(MAD) is typically stronger than the effect of innocent infringement: 
Hypothesis 2: Patents granted to firms active in technology areas characterized by dense patent 
thickets are less likely to be opposed than patents of firms without such involvement. 
This is the second main hypothesis we test empirically. We now turn to two additional hypotheses that 
capture effects specific to patent thickets. 
Within a given technology area we can distinguish between firms that are directly affected by patent 
thickets, because their own patents are part of the thicket, and other firms that are affected indirectly. 
The former we label insiders, the latter outsiders. Outsiders are likely to own technology that is not 
closely related to the core technologies of the thicket. Concerns of reciprocity should matter less to 
firms contemplating opposition against these patent-applicants, as they are not strongly involved in the 
technologies around which thickets have evolved. We would therefore expect that the MAD effect 
discussed above is less likely to protect outsiders against opposition. Insiders on the other hand have 
incentives to resolve conflicts arising within patent thickets cooperatively. For instance, the CEOs of 
two central players in the smart phone industry, Apple and Google, have attempted to end a situation 
of suits and subsequent counter-suits in bilateral negotiations at the board level.10 This leads us to 
expect that: 
Hypothesis 3: Patents granted to patent thicket “insiders” will be opposed less frequently than patents 
granted to patent thicket “outsiders”. 
Finally, we note that patent portfolio size of a firm is likely to moderate the effect of patent thicket 
density on incentives to oppose the firm’s patent applications. Larger firms will find it easier to obtain 
broad cross-licensing agreements (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001), reducing their exposure to 
opposition from large rivals. Cross-licensing is frequently adopted in technologies affected by patent 
thickets. The denser a patent thicket the more likely it is that an applicant with a large portfolio will 
                                                 
10  Apple’s CEO Tim Cook and Google’s CEO Larry Page have been conducting behind-the-scenes talks about 
a range of intellectual property matters, including the mobile patent disputes between the companies in 
August 2012 (for more details see http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/30/us-google-apple-
idUSBRE87T15H20120830 , last accessed 18th of December 2012). 
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have patents covering much of the technology area, increasing the possibility that a large applicant can 
retaliate against an opposition by a small applicant. This will reduce incentives of smaller applicants to 
oppose patents filed by large applicants in patent thickets as well. Based on this reasoning we expect 
that dense patent thickets will reduce the likelihood of observing opposition against patents of holders 
of large-portfolios further:  
Hypothesis 4: The density of patent thickets negatively moderates the effect of patent portfolio size on 
the likelihood of opposition. 
 
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1 Data Sources  
We test these hypotheses by studying the likelihood of opposition as a function of variables that 
characterize the patent, the applicant and the context in which patenting and opposition are occurring. 
Our analysis is undertaken at the level of individual patents. A firm’s patenting activities are split into 
technical areas for which we derive patent thicket and ownership concentration measures. Our data 
include all patent applications filed at the EPO between 1980 and 2010. This data set was obtained 
from the PATSTAT11 database and contains bibliographic and legal information on patents, as well as 
information on the identity of the patent applicants, which has been combined with the ECOOM-
EUROSTAT–EPO PATSTAT Person Augmented Table (EEE-PPAT).12 From these data, we obtained 
information whether an opposition was filed for each granted patent. This binary variable is the 
dependent variable in our regression analysis.  
In total, we observe 2,196,980 patent applications at the EPO between 1980 and 2007 that resulted in a 
total of 1,099,553 granted patents to date (see Table 1). It should be noted that many applications are 
still pending. For example, 70% of patent applications in the 2007 application cohort were still under 
examination in March, 2011. For 1,044,069 granted patents, we can observe whether there was an 
opposition by the end of the first quarter of 2011. 64,946 oppositions were filed against granted 
patents, which yield an average opposition rate of 6.04%. Table 1 shows that while the annual number 
of patent applications has steadily increased over time, both the share of patent applications that led to 
granted patents, as well as the number of oppositions relative to patents granted remained relatively 
stable until the late 90s. The decline in both grant and opposition rates towards the end of the 
                                                 
11  Information on PATSTAT is available at http://www.epo.org/searching/subscription/raw/product-14-
24_de.html (last accessed on Sep. 18th, 2011). 
12  We use the applicant names provided by the ECOOM-EUROSTAT–EPO PATSTAT Person Augmented 
Table (EEE-PPAT) which provides harmonized applicant names for the PATSTAT database. See Du Plessis 
et al. (2009), Peeters et al. (2009) and Magermann et al. (2009) for a full description. We further applied 
harmonization routines to the important patent applicants.  
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observation period is due to truncation as the examination of patent applications is lengthy. Grant lags 
at the EPO are on average longer than 4 years and vary considerably (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009). 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Below, we describe the variables we use to test our hypotheses, before presenting descriptive statistics. 
4.2 Variables 
Dependent variable 
Opposition. For each granted patent in our sample, we observe whether an opposition was filed within 
the statutory period of 9 months after the grant date. This is the dependent variable in our analysis. 
 
Independent variables 
Concentration of patent ownership. We measure the overall concentration of patent ownership as the 
Herfindahl index of rivals’ granted patents (i.e., all patents excluding the focal firm’s own patents) in a 
given technology area in a given year. In calculating the measure, we distinguish 30 different 
technological areas according to the OST-INPI/FhG-ISI technology classification (OECD, 1994). We 
use this firm-area-year level variable as an independent measure of the importance of the public goods 
effect. If a few rivals dominate an area, the benefit from successfully challenging a patent is higher, 
and opposition should be more likely to occur.  
Density of patent thickets – Triples of mutually blocking firms. Our primary measure of the density of 
patent thickets in a particular technology area is the “triples” measure introduced by (Graevenitz et al., 
2011; 2012). This measure is based on critical references listed in the search reports of the EPO. 
Critical references point to prior art that limits the patentability of an invention. For example, the 
existence of an older – but similar – invention can threaten the patentability of a newer invention 
because the newer invention is not novel or lacks inventiveness. In these cases, critical documents 
containing conflicting prior art are referenced in search reports at the EPO as X or Y references 
(Harhoff et al., 2006). If the patentability of firm A’s inventions is frequently limited by existing 
patents of firm B, it is reasonable to assume that A is blocked by B to a certain degree. If the inverse is 
also true, A and B are in a mutually blocking relationship. To capture more complex structures of 
blocking relationships we follow (Graevenitz et al., 2011) and compute the number of “triples” in 
which three firms mutually block each other’s patents (see Figure 1). They argue that in such a setting, 
the complexity of blocking relationships increases, and resolution of blocking becomes increasingly 
costly. Then, the triples measure can be taken as a proxy measure of the density of a patent thicket that 
reflects the likelihood that further overlaps between firms’ patents exist.  
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INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
From a computational perspective, blocking pairs and triples are identified using the following 
approach: for each firm i we analyze all critical patent references contained in search reports 
pertaining to firm i’s patents in a given technology area over the current and the two preceding years 
(t−2 to t).13 In the next step, we keep the most frequently referenced firms (top 10) yielding annual 
lists of firms which are blocking firm i.14 Pairs are then established if firm A is on firm B’s list of most 
frequently referenced firms and, at the same time, if firm B is on firm A’s list of most frequently 
referenced firms. Finally, triples are formed if firm A and firm B, firm A and firm C, and firm B and 
firm C form pairs of mutually blocking relationships in the same period (see Figure 1).  
In order to test our insider-outside hypothesis (Hypothesis 3), we split the count of triples at the level 
of a technical area into two components: a firm-level count of the number of triples in which the firm 
itself is involved (insider triples), and the count of triples present in the technological area without the 
involvement of the focal firm (rivals’ triples).  
Fragmentation. To control for the impact of fragmentation of prior art we use Ziedonis’ (2004) 
fragmentation index and apply the correction proposed by Hall (2005b). She argues that high 
fragmentation of ownership among the rivals of a patent holder would exacerbate the problem of 
negotiating access to those technologies. This measure is frequently used to control for the effects of 
patent thickets in the literature (Ziedonis, 2004; Schankerman and Noel, 2006; Galasso and 
Schankerman, 2010; Cockburn and MacGarvie, 2011). 
 
Covariates 
Applicant characteristics. For each applicant we compute the logarithm of the cumulative number of 
patent applications filed at the EPO as a proxy for the size of the patent portfolio. It is reasonable to 
assume that the likelihood of patent opposition should decrease with the size of an applicant’s patent 
portfolio.15 Moreover, we include dummy variables for an applicant’s country of origin, distinguishing 
applicants from the United States of America, Japan, Europe, and the rest of the world. Europe is used 
as the reference group in the regressions reported below. We also distinguish between four types of 
                                                 
13  We analyze a time span of three years to account for cumulativeness in technological progress. Relying on a 
three year window is an arbitrary choice. While the measure differs in its absolute values depending on the 
time window chosen, its variation across fields is robust w.r.t. different time windows. 
14  Taking only the top 10 blocking firms is an arbitrary choice to easy computational burden. Choosing 
different cut-off levels does not affect our results significantly. 
15  See Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) and Harhoff and Reitzig (2004) for discussions of this effect. 
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applicants: individuals, government institutions, universities, and a reference group, which consists 
mainly of private enterprises. 
Patent characteristics. Previous research has shown that the likelihood of post-grant validity challenges 
depends on a number of patent characteristics. Most notably, it has been shown that the (private) value 
of patents is positively related to the likelihood of litigation and opposition (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2001; Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004). We include the number of citations a patent receives 
over a five-year period (in logarithms) as a (noisy) proxy for its private value (Harhoff et al., 1999). 
Moreover, we also include the number of jurisdictions in which equivalent patents have been filed to 
control for patent value in our regressions (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004b) and a variable 
indicating whether a patent was filed via the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) application path.16 
Following prior work (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004; Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2004a), we also include the number of claims and variables describing the composition 
of backward references contained in a patent’s search report as they can be expected to determine the 
likelihood of patent opposition. At the EPO, references contained in a patent’s search report are 
classified into different categories. A-type references merely summarize prior art without implying a 
limitation of novelty or inventive step. X-type references indicate that a single prior patent is in 
conflict with the applications claims. Y-type reference may do the same in combination with each 
other. (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004) show that the number of X references is positively related to the 
likelihood of an opposition being filed. (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009) show that patents with a high 
number of such references are less likely to be granted. 
 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the number of patent grants, the number of oppositions, as well as the average 
number of triples, and the average concentration of patent holdings for the 30 different technology 
fields for the period from 1980 to 2007.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
While the different technology areas vary considerably in their number of patent applications and 
grants, we also observe interesting variation in the opposition rates, as well as the existence of patent 
thickets and the degree patent ownership concentration.  
                                                 
16  A PCT application also allows applicants to postpone decisions regarding the scope of international 
protection for up to 30 months and might signal the intention to commercialize the protected invention in a 
large number of national markets.  
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Figure 2 shows the development of opposition rates over time for six main technology areas. For 
almost all of them, opposition rates have declined since the EPO began its operation with the start of 
examination in 1978 and the first patent grants in 1980. Opposition rates are lowest for patents in the 
main technological field of electrical engineering, and the decline of opposition rates has been 
particularly pronounced in this main technology area, which also subsumes technology areas for 
information and telecommunications technology. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Our measure of the existence and density of patent thickets – the number of triples of mutually 
blocking relations between patent applicants – is particularly high in complex technologies belonging 
to the main field of electrical engineering, such as Audiovisual Technology, Telecommunications, IT 
and Semiconductors.17 Other studies have suggested that these are the technology areas characterized 
by overlapping patent rights and patent thickets, see for instance Hall and Ziedonis (2001), 
Schankerman and Noel (200) and Cockburn and MacGarvie (2011). The areas with the lowest 
(average) number of triples are Agriculture/Food, Thermal Processes, and Space 
Technology/Weapons.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 3 graphs opposition rates and the number of triples over time for the three areas with the 
highest and the three areas with the lowest triples counts. Increases in the number of triples in 
Audiovisual Technology and Telecommunications are accompanied by a decrease in the respective 
opposition rates.18 Both Table 2 and Figure 3 suggest that areas with very dense thickets (high levels 
of triples) are also characterized by below-average opposition rates. In fact, the coefficient of 
correlation between the number of triples and the opposition rate is -0.43 and highly significant. We 
also find a highly significant, but somewhat smaller correlation between the concentration of 
ownership of granted patents and the opposition rate in a technology field (coefficient of correlation -
0.24).  
 
                                                 
17  We also find a large number of triples in the field of Pharmaceutical and Cosmetics. See evidence for 
strategic patenting behavior in cosmetics by Hall and Harhoff (2002). 
18  A similar development can be observed for the IT as well the Semiconductor areas which are not included in 
Figure 2, see von Graevenitz et al. (2007) for more complete time series of opposition rates in different 
technology areas. 
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INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
In Section 3 we argued that opposition rates vary between firms within a technical area, depending on 
the extent to which firms are caught up in the patent thicket. We distinguish between outsiders, whose 
patents are not part of the thicket, and insiders who may be more or less affected by the thicket. Figure 
4 provides information on the relative numbers of insiders and outsiders (size of circles) by technology 
area and period. The figure demonstrates that even in areas in which thickets are rife the vast majority 
of firms are not part of the thicket as measured by the triples measure. However, it is also clear from 
the figure that significant numbers of firms are caught up in many thickets, while only a few firms are 
caught up in a moderate number of thickets. Over time firms seem to be separating into two groups – 
one group which is caught up in patent thickets and one which is not. Figure 4 also demonstrates that 
over time, thickets are both getting more extensive within particular areas (firms caught up in triples 
are caught up in more of them) and that they are becoming more widespread across technological 
fields. In the regression analysis below, we further pursue the distinction between insiders and 
outsiders to determine how these two groups of firms are affected by opposition.  
 
5 Empirical Results 
This section provides results from regressions in which we test whether opposition becomes a public 
good if the number of potential opponents increases and in which we study the effects of patent 
thickets on opposition at the EPO. Using the cross-section of all granted patents at EPO between 1980 
and 2007 we estimate five probit models. The results are set out in Table 4. In all regressions we 
capture persistent differences across technologies using technology class fixed effects and time trends 
and shocks in specific years using time fixed-effects. Additionally, we include covariates capturing the 
legal strength of a patent and the economic value of the underlying invention. These covariates include 
the number and the composition of backward references included in a patent’s search report, which 
have been shown to be correlated to the legal strength of patent rights (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004; 
Harhoff and Wagner 2009), as well as the number of citations a patent receives, as a proxy of its value 
(Harhoff et al., 1999). Conditional on these covariates, any remaining variation in the data allows us to 
identify the effect of changes in the density of patent thickets and in the numbers of potential 
opponents to applications in specific technical fields on the incidence of opposition. 
In this analysis it is important to rule out endogeneity of the independent variables. One concern might 
be that the patent thicket proxy (triples) or the measure of the public goods effect might themselves be 
affected by incidence of opposition, leading to reverse causality. A second concern might be that 
unobservable determinants of opposition are correlated with the independent variables, leading to 
omitted variables bias. There are two reasons to discount these problems here. The first relates to the 
 15
time lag between current patent applications and an ultimate grant decision by the patent office (which 
puts patents at risk of being opposed by a third party) is on average more than 4 years (Harhoff and 
Wagner, 2009). This lag decouples opposition today and the measures of patent thickets and public 
goods effects, which are based on patents granted before the date on which today’s granted patents 
were submitted to the patent office. The lag and the associated uncertainty about future opponents 
strongly reduce the potential for reverse causality here. The second reason to discount endogeneity 
relates to the level of aggregation: the dependent variable in the regressions reported below is at the 
level of the granted patent application and will be affected mainly by patent application specific and 
firm specific unobservable effects. The variables capturing the effects of patent thickets average across 
all firms in a technology area or at least across several firms in that technology area. As such they are 
much less likely to correlate significantly with firm specific unobservable effects. Note that any 
technology area specific unobservable effects are captured by time and technology area fixed effects.  
In Table 3, we summarize descriptive statistics for the dependent and the independent variables. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
In Table 4 we report coefficients and marginal effects.19 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 present a 
specification including only covariates. As discussed in Section 4 their effects in this specification are 
expected to be driven either by patent value (higher value is likely to attract more opposition) or 
factors impacting the outcome of the case (a higher anticipated likelihood of having a patent revoked 
will attract more opposition). Moreover, other variables (such as the size of the patent portfolio) are 
expected to impact the likelihood of pre-opposition settlement or considerations of reciprocity and  
may therefore lead to more or fewer oppositions. 
Value-related variables such as the number of forward citations, the size of the international patent 
family (equivalents) and claims have a positive impact on the incidence of opposition, as expected. An 
increase by one logarithmic unit in the citation count is associated with an increased incidence of 
opposition of 2.7 percentage points (at the sample means of other covariates). One additional 
international patent filing increases incidence of opposition by about 0.1 percentage points. Ten 
additional claims are associated with about the same impact. These results are broadly consistent with 
earlier studies of opposition and of litigation (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Harhoff and Reitzig, 
2004; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004b). Higher generality and originality of patents are associated 
                                                 
19  We do not report the estimated coefficients for the time and area fixed effects here for reasons of brevity. The 
regression results can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
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with an increase in the likelihood of opposition. This may indicate that pioneering patents (with high 
originality) or widely diffusing patents (with high generality) attract more attention (and thus run a 
higher risk of opposition) than other patents, either for technical or monetary reasons. 
Following Harhoff and Reitzig (2004), we use the composition of backward references to   
characterize patent quality. While the total number of backward references is uninformative, an 
increase in the share of X-classified references listed in the search report leads to an increase in the 
likelihood of opposition. Conversely, A-classified references (which do not indicate any state of the art 
that might cast doubt on the patent’s novelty and inventive step) reduce the likelihood of opposition. 
We find a significant negative effect of PCT filings on opposition – PCT filings have an opposition 
incidence that is 1 percentage point lower than other filings. PCT filings are relevant for two reasons. 
First, this is a common filing path for patents protected in many jurisdictions. Hence, particularly 
valuable patents are likely to be filed via the PCT. On the other hand, PCT filings also enjoy 
considerable option value, since the decision which regions to enter can be delayed by up to 30 months 
after the priority date, adding 18 months of delay compared to “normal” international applications.  
As expected, firms with large portfolios experience a lower incidence of opposition. Again, this 
finding confirms earlier results (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; 2004a) and is consistent with the 
view that large firms enjoy advantages in the process of resolving disputes over IP. The median size of 
an applicant’s patent portfolio (cumulative number of patent grants until the end of 2007) across all 
technology areas is 64, the largest patent portfolio is 20,433. The average marginal effect of a one 
logarithmic unit increase in patents is a reduction in opposition by 0.3 percentage points. 
Non-European applicants are significantly less likely to face opposition than European patent holders. 
This is not surprising, as patent filings from non-European countries have gone through stronger 
selection filters than patent filings of the local applicants – a lower opposition rate for the patents 
granted to this group of applicants is therefore not surprising. Finally, some applicant types 
(individuals, universities and government organizations) experience a significantly lower risk of 
opposition than other (mostly corporate) patent holders. Again, the effect may be driven by relatively 
low patent value or the pre-selection of patents of particularly high quality. There is evidence that both 
arguments apply – Gambardella, Harhoff and Verspagen (2008) report that patents from these three 
types of applicants are usually of lower commercial value than corporate patents. At the same time, the 
“inventive step” of these filings can be above average.  
Our main variables of interest are the concentration of patent ownership among the applicant’s rivals 
and the effects of the triples measure of patent thicket density. In column (3) we just include the two 
main variables: concentration as a measure for the public goods effect and triples as a measure of 
thicket density.  Hypothesis 1 states that concentration should have a positive sign if there is a public 
goods effect. We cannot reject this hypothesis: the average marginal effect of concentration is 0.82 
which is highly significant. At the median of all variables a one standard deviation increase (0.0106) 
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of concentration leads to an increase in the probability of opposition by more than 0.75 percentage 
points (0.0106*0.7113=0.0075). This effect is also economically important as it translates to a 12.5% 
increase in the opposition rate relative to the unconditional opposition rate of 6.04%. Second, 
Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected. The count of technology area triples is associated with a significant 
reduction in opposition incidence. The number of technology area triples ranges between zero and 87 
in our data, with a median value of 5. The average marginal effect of technology area triples on 
opposition is -0.0009 which is highly significant. At the median of all variables a one standard 
deviation increase in the triple count (16.90) reduces the incidence of opposition by 1.34 percentage 
points (16.89*-0.00079=0.0134). That is a 22.2% reduction relative to the unconditional opposition 
rate.   
We use the fragmentation variable in our regressions to confirm that higher-order dependencies (such 
as captured by the triples variable) offer a better way of describing the density of patent thickets than 
the fragmentation measure that was previously used in the literature to approximate the density of 
patent thickets (Ziedonis, 2004). The coefficient is positive20 and highly significant. However the 
economic effect of fragmentation on opposition is much weaker (2.8% at the median of all variables) 
than that of triples or of the public goods effect.   
To test whether Hypothesis 3 can be rejected we split the number of technology area triples into two 
groups: 1) triples which the holder of the focal patent is involved in - own triples; 2) triples which 
other firms in the same technical area are involved in. In unreported results we find that the effects of 
own triples are not significant unless we include a quadratic effect for own triples. Then the linear and 
the quadratic terms are highly significant as is shown in columns 7 and 8. Interpreting this functional 
form analytically is complex, so we plot the average marginal effects of own and rivals’ triples for all 
values of own triples in Figure 5. In Figure 6 we also provide the predicted probability of opposition 
for all values of own triples. Both Figures indicate that at very low values of own triples the 
probability of opposition increases or is constant, but beyond 6 own triples this effect is reversed. At 
the median of all other variables a firm that is part of 14 own triples experiences a reduction in the 
probability of opposition by 0.18% from an additional own triple whereas an additional rival triple 
only reduces the probability of opposition by 0.08%. Both effects are statistically highly significant 
but relatively modest economically. Note that the 98th percentile of own triples is 12, so only a small 
number of patent applicants are affected by this reduction in the probability of opposition.  
Hypothesis 4 posits that patent applications of larger firms are likely to encounter opposition less 
frequently in patent thickets. This leads to an interaction between the measure of patent thickets 
                                                 
20  If fragmentation of patent ownership is used as a proxy measure of patent thickets we should expect a 
negative coefficient for this variable. We find that in unreported specifications the variable has a negative 
coefficient as long as size is measured in levels. However, the effects are not significant or only at the 10% 
level, depending on which other variables are included. We transform the size variable using the logarithm to 
improve the fit of our regressions. 
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(triples) and the measure of firm size. We test the hypothesis in the specification that includes only 
technology area triples (columns 5 and 6) and in the specification that includes both own and rivals’ 
triples (columns 9 and 10). In both cases we find that the interaction term has a statistically significant 
negative effect. We cannot reject Hypothesis 4 in either specification. Nor does the introduction of 
Hypothesis 4 lead to a rejection of Hypothesis 3. At the median of all variables a one standard 
deviation increase in the number of rivals’ triples changes the marginal effect of the logarithm of firm 
size by 0.07% of the unconditional probability of opposition. This effect gets larger in technology 
areas with more extensive patent thickets but from an economic perspective the effect remains modest. 
6 Conclusions and Further Research 
Strong demand for patent rights combined with errors in patent offices’ examination and grant 
procedures result in increasing numbers of “weak” and overlapping patent rights. As a result 
companies are increasingly confronted with serious challenges when trying to develop and 
commercialize technology in the presence of patent thickets. Litigation and post-grant validity 
challenges have been considered as a way of eliminating erroneously granted patent rights - with post-
grant patent review typically being cheaper than litigation. Discussing the America Invents Act (AIA) 
which was enacted at the end of 2011, Graham and Vishnubhakat (2013) highlight three avenues for 
post-grant validity challenges that have recently been introduced in the United States with the explicit 
aim of raising patent quality. These are post-grant review, “covered business method patents” (or third 
party) review, and inter partes (or third party) review.21 
We argue, as do previous studies, that post-grant opposition is likely to lose its effectiveness where 
multiple opponents fail to engage in opposition due to a public goods effect. Moreover, the logic of 
mutually assured destruction in patent thickets will result in fewer patent opposition cases there than in 
technologies not affected by patent thickets. The rate of patent opposition at EPO has been stable for 
20 years at around 8% in the technology area of Chemistry which is characterized by a relatively high 
concentration of patent ownership and is thus less likely to be affected by a public goods problem. As 
in other discrete technologies, the incidence of “triples” is low in Chemistry. Meanwhile the 
opposition rate in Electrical Engineering has fallen by 50% in the same period, from a starting level of 
5.5% in 1990. Electrical Engineering is the technology area most affected by patent thickets, and 
ownership concentration is low. Our results indicate that these relationships go beyond these two 
exemplary technologies - the broad trends in our data can be shown to be associated with the 
                                                 
21  The new post-grant opposition mechanism at the USPTO allows to challenge patents on all grounds, 
including eligibility and clarity. The “covered business method” review procedure allows third parties that 
face the threat (or are actually sued) to challenge its validity independently of the issue date of the potentially 
infringed business method patent. Finally, the “inter partes”, or third-party submission, allows any member of 
the public to participate by submitting documents and commentary for use by patent examiners. See Graham 
and Vishnubhakat (2013) for details. 
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aforementioned public goods problem and with the presence of patent thickets. Moreover, opposition 
rates decline with the size of an applicant’s portfolio, and the more so the denser the patent thicket. 
Finally, the likelihood of opposition is affected by the position of firms within patent thickets.  
These findings are of high relevance for the users of patent systems and for those concerned with the 
governance of such systems. Unfortunately, our results show that in complex technologies, in which 
the need for a corrective seems to be highest, private incentives to engage in post-grant validity 
challenges are particularly low. This demonstrates that a focus on examination quality is especially 
important for such complex technologies and that “rational ignorance” of patent offices (Lemley et al. 
2001) is not a particularly effective approach in these technologies. It remains to be seen whether the 
relatively recent establishment of defensive patent aggregators (Hagiu and Yoffie, 2013) will reverse 
the public goods effect in complex technology areas and will lead to effective use of the mechanisms 
created by the America Invents Act. This act certainly has created scope for more collective activity of 
this kind. However, our analysis suggests that it will have to be smaller applicants who contribute to 
ensuring that weak patents are kept off the register or removed from it when first asserted. 
Collectively, their interests in such a mechanism working are much stronger than those of larger firms 
at the heart of thickets whose cooperative actions through cross-licensing do not remove weak patents 
from the patent register. Further work on whether the interests of the many patent thicket outsiders can 
be harnessed in their and the interests of society seems warranted. 
Our results also raise important questions for the management of patent rights at the firm level. The 
choice between adversarial and collaborative means of conflict resolution becomes blurred when the 
problems discussed in this study arise. “Navigating thickets” can require considerable brinkmanship. 
To date, scholarly research can provide little guidance for firms’ operational or strategic patent 
management in such a context. While we have not studied the dynamics of opposition, it is 
conceivable that periods of collusion are sometimes terminated by “patent wars”. The analogy to 
collusive price-setting and intermittent price wars is obvious. In our case, controversies surrounding 
singularly important patents or divergent opinions about optimal firm strategy may lead patent-holders 
to resort to court interaction in some cases, possibly triggering counteractions by other parties. Such 
break-downs in collaborative “thicket management” may be occurring currently in the mobile 
telephony industry. The current dispute between the major players (most notably between Apple and 
Google) can be seen as a telling example of firms trying to find the right balance between 
confrontational and collaborative conflict resolution in an industry characterized by patent thickets. 
We suggest that research regarding the factors that trigger “patent wars” which can be socially and 
privately detrimental should receive particular attention in future work on patent management. 
To summarize, our study shows once more just how challenging the management of innovation in 
complex technologies is. The dense interaction between holders of mutually blocking patents can 
render post-grant review rather ineffective in particular technological areas. These mechanisms which 
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are meant to ensure that strong patents survive on the register while weak patents are eliminated lose 
some of their appeal in this context. Our study cannot offer any strong results as to how the problem of 
weak patents in complex technologies can be addressed, but it shows that once firms have adopted the 
logic of patent portfolio races, the incentives to patent more and litigate less against holders of large 
patent portfolios spreads even to firms initially not caught up in the thicket but being active in the 
same technology. This tendency of patent thickets to self-perpetuate and grow is worrying. Whether 
the instruments soon to be available at the USPTO or post-grant mechanisms relying on independent 
parties other than the directly affected firms, such as an ombudsman who acts in the public interest can 
alleviate this problem, or whether a much greater emphasis on examination quality is required remains 
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Figure 1 Schematic Presentation of Unilateral and Bilateral Blocking Relationships 
 
 
Note: Adopted from von Graevenitz et al. (2011), Figure 1. 
 





Figure 3 Triples (left ordinate) and Rate of Opposition (right ordinate) at the EPO (1980 
to 2007) by Application Year and Technological Area  
 
 
Note: Audiovisual, Telecommunication and Pharmaceuticals/Cosmetics have the highest average 
number of triples between 1980 and 2007. Agriculture/Food, Thermal Processes and Space 
Technology/Weapons have the lowest average number of Triples between 1980 and 2007. 
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Figure 5 Average Marginal Effects of Additional Own and Rivals’ Triples by Number 



























1980  21,174   14,685   69.35% 18 0.09% 1,439   9.80% 
1981  27,179   18,686   68.75% 24 0.09% 1,890   10.11%
1982  30,174   20,960   69.46% 40 0.13% 2,097   10.00%
1983  33,187   22,888   68.97% 72 0.22% 2,037   8.90% 
1984  38,927   26,455   67.96% 82 0.21% 2,307   8.72% 
1985  41,495   28,051   67.60% 41 0.10% 2,308   8.23% 
1986  45,292   30,325   66.95% 48 0.11% 2,291   7.55% 
1987  48,251   32,002   66.32% 137 0.28% 2,268   7.09% 
1988  55,124   36,096   65.48% 288 0.52% 2,429   6.73% 
1989  61,132   39,068   63.91% 496 0.81% 2,526   6.47% 
1990  67,714   44,651   65.94% 236 0.35% 2,676   5.99% 
1991  63,062   42,314   67.10% 52 0.08% 2,633   6.22% 
1992  64,536   43,341   67.16% 332 0.51% 2,686   6.20% 
1993  63,954   44,052   68.88% 170 0.27% 2,572   5.84% 
1994  65,921   45,191   68.55% 367 0.56% 2,660   5.89% 
1995  69,419   46,516   67.01% 659 0.95% 2,661   5.72% 
1996  75,930   49,119   64.69% 1,195 1.57% 2,739   5.58% 
1997  85,556   52,238   61.06% 2,070 2.42% 2,720   5.21% 
1998  96,548   55,421   57.40% 3,538 3.66% 2,826   5.10% 
1999  105,158   57,104   54.30% 6,089 5.79% 3,056   5.35% 
2000  116,787   60,107   51.47% 9,215 7.89% 3,033   5.05% 
2001  123,391   58,472   47.39% 15,058 12.20% 3,045   5.21% 
2002  121,510   53,105   43.70% 22,023 18.12% 2,529   4.76% 
2003  124,682   48,768   39.11% 32,807 26.31% 2,357   4.83% 
2004  130,627   43,203   33.07% 46,478 35.58% 1,936   4.48% 
2005  137,877   37,297   27.05% 62,783 45.54% 1,535   4.12% 
2006  140,983   29,407   20.86% 80,626 57.19% 1,089   3.70% 
2007  138,638   20,031   14.45% 97,202 70.11% 545   2.72% 
Total   2,194,228  1,099,553  50.11% 382,146 17.42% 64,890  5.90% 




Table 2  Patent Grants, Oppositions, Opposition Rate, Triples and Concentration of 
Rivals’ Patent Grants by Technology Area (1980 - 2007) 









       
Electrical 
Engineering/Energy  64,479 2,927 4.54% 17.56 0.0109 
Audiovisual  40,313 1,321 3.28% 40.72 0.0279 
Telecom  58,379 1,199 2.05% 61.95 0.0273 
IT  40,209 879 2.19% 25.94 0.0186 
Semiconductors  20,130 412 2.05% 18.97 0.0241 
Optical  36,359 1,035 2.85% 16.85 0.0200 
Analysis/Measurement/Control 
Techn. 67,140 3,361 5.01% 8.91 0.0045 
Medical Technology  55,032 3,412 6.20% 17.49 0.0068 
Nuclear Technology  4,475 253 5.65% 0.80 0.0472 
Organic Chemistry  52,776 2,273 4.31% 6.66 0.0117 
Polymers  49,624 4,675 9.42% 12.42 0.0149 
Pharmaceuticals/Cosmetics  56,060 4,550 8.12% 28.27 0.0059 
Biotechnology  17,363 1,166 6.72% 2.03 0.0056 
Petrol Chem./Materials 
Chem.  26,495 2,649 10.00% 12.57 0.0162 
Surface Technology  20,674 1,762 8.52% 1.37 0.0056 
Materials  29,226 3,006 10.29% 1.44 0.0051 
Chemical Engineering  41,972 3,112 7.41% 3.33 0.0034 
Material 
processing/Textiles/Paper  46,831 4,467 9.54% 1.75 0.0041 
Handling/Printing  64,913 3,737 5.76% 17.19 0.0067 
Agriculture & Food Process-
Machines  14,226 1,365 9.60% 0.73 0.0134 
Environment  8,484 543 6.40% 3.43 0.0130 
Machine Tools  34,085 2,617 7.68% 0.96 0.0035 
Motors  34,067 1,590 4.67% 19.59 0.0198 
Thermal Processes  14,473 1,052 7.27% 0.69 0.0089 
Mechanical Elements  41,708 2,048 4.91% 1.10 0.0048 
Transportation  62,214 3,240 5.21% 22.80 0.0074 
Space Technology/Weapons  5,504 213 3.87% 0.00 0.0211 
Consumer Goods  46,106 2,433 5.28% 3.66 0.0033 
Construction Technology  35,282 2,094 5.94% 2.10 0.0024 
       
Total   1,099,553 64,890 5.90% 16.59 0.0113 







Table 3  Descriptive Statistics 
VARIABLES MEAN S.D. MEDIAN MIN MAX 
Opposition (0/1) 0.06 --- 0.00 0.00 1.00
Number of area triples 12.17 16.89 5.00 0.00 87.00
Number of own triples 0.91 3.26 0.00 0.00 32.00
Number of rivals’ triples 11.26 15.74 5.00 0.00 87.00
Concentration of rivals' patents 
x100 1.06 0.98 0.70 0.15 11.72
Fragmentation x100 68.92 42.91 95.04 0.00 100.00
Cum. number of patents /1000  1.09 2.55 0.06 0.00 20.44
Company applicant (0/1) 0.89 --- 1.00 0.00 1.00
Individual applicant (0/1) 0.07 --- 0.00 0.00 1.00
University applicant (0/1) 0.01 --- 0.00 0.00 1.00
Government applicant (0/1) 0.02 --- 0.00 0.00 1.00
Generality 0.10 0.20 0.00 0.00 1.00
Originality 0.29 0.34 0.20 0.00 1.00
Total references 3.89 2.83 4.00 0.00 123.00
Citations received within 5 
years 0.82 1.61 0.00 0.00 100.00
Share of X relative to total 
references 0.19 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00
Share of Y relative to total 
references 0.10 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00
Share of A relative to total 
references 0.49 0.38 0.50 0.00 1.00
Number of equivalents 7.52 5.96 6.00 1.00 346.00
PCT filing (0/1) 0.35 --- 0.00 0.00 1.00
Number of claims 13.49 10.45 11.00 0.00 476.00
EU applicant (0/1) 0.54 --- 1.00 0.00 1.00
US applicant (0/1) 0.23 --- 0.00 0.00 1.00
Japanese applicant (0/1) 0.19 --- 0.00 0.00 1.00
Applicant ROW (0/1) 0.04 --- 0.00 0.00 1.00
 













Table 4  Results from Probit Regressions – Dependent Variable: Opposition (0/1)  
 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES  Coeff. dx/dy Coeff. dx/dy Coeff. dx/dy Coeff. dx/dy Coeff. dx/dy 
Number of area triples ya   -0.0082*** -0.0009*** ‐0.0065***  ‐0.0009***        
     [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000]        
Number of rivals' triples fya       ‐0.0083***  ‐0.0009***  ‐0.0097***  ‐0.0009*** 
        [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.000] 
Number of own triples fya        0.0173***  0.0018***  0.0191***  0.0020*** 
         [0.004]  [0.000]  [0.004]  [0.000] 
Number of own triples squared fya        ‐0.0013***    ‐0.0013***   
         [0.000]    [0.000]   
Number of  triples x       -0.0003***      ‐0.0005***   
number of patents (log)      [0.000]      [0.000]   
Concentration of rivals' patents fya   7.2972*** 0.8280*** 7.1644*** 0.8129*** 7.4818*** 0.8487*** 7.4440*** 0.8444*** 
     [0.499] [0.057] [0.502] [0.057] [0.504] [0.057] [0.504] [0.057] 
Fragmentation fya   0.0416*** 0.0047*** 0.0396*** 0.0045*** 0.0448***  0.0051***  0.0429***  0.0049*** 
     [0.006] [0.001] [0.006] [0.001] [0.006]  [0.001]  [0.006]  [0.001] 
Cum. number of patents (log) fy -0.0267*** -0.0030*** -0.0272*** -0.0031*** -0.0235*** -0.0030*** ‐0.0311***  ‐0.0035***  ‐0.0267***  ‐0.0035*** 
   [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]  [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.000] 
Individual applicant (0/1) f -0.2706*** -0.0308*** -0.2615*** -0.0297*** -0.2585*** -0.0293*** ‐0.2667***  ‐0.0303***  ‐0.2640***  ‐0.0300*** 
  [0.009] [0.001] [0.009] [0.001] [0.009] [0.001] [0.009]  [0.001]  [0.009]  [0.001] 
University applicant (0/1) f -0.2630*** -0.0299*** -0.2692*** -0.0305*** -0.2694*** -0.0306*** ‐0.2658***  ‐0.0302***  ‐0.2657***  ‐0.0301*** 
  [0.021] [0.002] [0.021] [0.002] [0.021] [0.002] [0.021]  [0.002]  [0.021]  [0.002] 
Government applicant (0/1) f -0.2941*** -0.0335*** -0.2970*** -0.0337*** -0.2974*** -0.0337*** ‐0.2915***  ‐0.0331***  ‐0.2907***  ‐0.0330*** 
   [0.016] [0.002] [0.016] [0.002] [0.016] [0.002] [0.016]  [0.002]  [0.016]  [0.002] 
Generality p 0.2320*** 0.0264*** 0.2316*** 0.0263*** 0.2307*** 0.0262*** 0.2341***  0.0266***  0.2338***  0.0265*** 
  [0.011] [0.001] [0.011] [0.001] [0.011] [0.001] [0.011]  [0.001]  [0.011]  [0.001] 
Originality p 0.0929*** 0.0106*** 0.0802*** 0.0091*** 0.0804*** 0.0091*** 0.0816***  0.0093***  0.0824***  0.0093*** 
   [0.007] [0.001] [0.007] [0.001] [0.007] [0.001] [0.007]  [0.001]  [0.007]  [0.001] 
ln(1+total references) p 0.0021 0.0002 -0.0047 -0.0005 -0.0047 -0.0005 ‐0.0056  ‐0.0006  ‐0.0057  ‐0.0006 
   [0.004] [0.000] [0.004] [0.001] [0.004] [0.001] [0.004]  [0.001]  [0.004]  [0.001] 
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Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. SEs have been clustered by firm, area and year and are reported in brackets. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Source of variation is indicated in the second column: f - firm, y - year, a - area, p – patent. 
Marginal effects are average marginal effects calculated using STATA’s margins command. 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES  Coeff. dx/dy Coeff. dx/dy Coeff. dx/dy Coeff. dx/dy Coeff. dx/dy 
ln(1+ citations received within 5 years) ya 0.2342*** 0.0267*** 0.2339*** 0.0265*** 0.2340*** 0.0265*** 0.2338*** 0.0265*** 0.2337*** 0.0265*** 
   [0.004] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000] 
Share of X relative to total references fya 0.0491*** 0.0056*** 0.0451*** 0.0051*** 0.0461*** 0.0052*** 0.0445*** 0.0050*** 0.0457*** 0.0052*** 
  [0.010] [0.001] [0.010] [0.001] [0.010] [0.001] [0.010] [0.001] [0.010] [0.001] 
Share of Y relative to total references fya -0.0256* -0.0029* -0.0385** -0.0044** -0.0374** -0.0042** -0.0385** -0.0044** -0.0370** -0.0042** 
  [0.012] [0.001] [0.012] [0.001] [0.012] [0.001] [0.012] [0.001] [0.012] [0.001] 
Share of A relative to total references fya -0.1217*** -0.0138*** -0.1131*** -0.0128*** -0.1130*** -0.0128*** -0.1118*** -0.0127*** -0.1113*** -0.0126*** 
  [0.009] [0.001] [0.009] [0.001] [0.009] [0.001] [0.009] [0.001] [0.009] [0.001] 
Number of equivalents  0.0096*** 0.0011*** 0.0094*** 0.0011*** 0.0094*** 0.0011*** 0.0094*** 0.0011*** 0.0094*** 0.0011*** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
PCT filing (0/1) fya -0.1028*** -0.0117*** -0.1001*** -0.0114*** -0.1004*** -0.0114*** -0.0999*** -0.0113*** -0.1005*** -0.0114*** 
   [0.006] [0.001] [0.006] [0.001] [0.006] [0.001] [0.006] [0.001] [0.006] [0.001] 
Number of claims fya 0.0006** 0.0001** 0.0008** 0.0001** 0.0008** 0.0001** 0.0008** 0.0001** 0.0008** 0.0001** 
   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
US applicant (0/1) fy -0.1512*** -0.0172*** -0.1623*** -0.0184*** -0.1627*** -0.0185*** -0.1614*** -0.0183*** -0.1612*** -0.0183*** 
   [0.007] [0.001] [0.007] [0.001] [0.007] [0.001] [0.007] [0.001] [0.007] [0.001] 
Japanese applicant (0/1) 
f -0.2534*** -0.0288*** -0.2638*** -0.0299*** -0.2634*** -0.0299*** -0.2625*** -0.0298*** -0.2619*** -0.0297*** 
  [0.008] [0.001] [0.008] [0.001] [0.008] [0.001] [0.008] [0.001] [0.008] [0.001] 
Applicant ROW (0/1) f -0.2863*** -0.0326*** -0.2805*** -0.0318*** -0.2810*** -0.0319*** -0.2813*** -0.0319*** -0.2812*** -0.0319*** 
  [0.018] [0.002] [0.019] [0.002] [0.019] [0.002] [0.019] [0.002] [0.019] [0.002] 
Time fixed effects       (Grant years) f YES YES YES YES YES
Area fixed effects   YES YES YES YES YES
Log-likelihood p -225200 -224382 -224362 -224311 -224275 
Observations  1,044,069 1,044,069 1,044,069 1,044,069  1,044,069 
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